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Abstract:  
 
There is a traditional debate in analytic aesthetics that surrounds the classification of 
film as Art. While much philosophy devoted to considering film has now moved 
beyond this debate and accepts film as a mass art, a sub-category of Art proper, it is 
worth re-considering the criticism of film pre-Deleuze. Much of the criticism of film as 
pseudo-art is expressed in moral terms. T. W. Adorno, for example, critiques film as 
‘mass-cult’; mass produced culture which presents a ‘flattened’ version of reality. 
Adorno worries about the passivity encouraged in viewers. Films are narrative 
artworks, received by an audience in a context, making the focus on the reception of 
the work important. The dialogue held between Adorno and Walter Benjamin post-
WWII is interesting because, between them, they consider both the possible positive 
emancipatory and negative politicization effects of film as a mass produced and 
distributed story-telling medium. Reading Adorno alongside Benjamin is a way to 
highlight the role of the critical thinker who receives the film. Arguing that the critical 
thinker is a valuable citizen, this paper focuses on the value of critical thinking in the 
reception of cinematic artworks. It achieves this by reconsidering Adorno and 
Benjamin's theories of mass art. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thoughts on Film: Critically engaging with Adorno and Benjamin.  
 
Introduction: 
 
Much of the current philosophy of film literature pursues an optimistic approach that 
may be identified with Walter Benjamin’s hope for the art of the masses. This 
optimism sees film as a vehicle for screening philosophical thought experiments, and 
offering new perspectives on issues relevant to everyday life by engendering critical 
consciousness. If films allow for philosophical thinking, then they encourage social, 
political and economic critique of social norms. Yet, most popular films that are 
digested in large quantities are Hollywood or Bollywood blockbuster films that are 
generally criticized for depicting stereotypes and for eliciting formulaic emotions 
(Collingwood, 1969, 57). Theorists who conceive of cinema as a means of thinking 
must firstly reply to the objections that most films are formulaic and do not encourage 
active, intelligent, or imaginative participation. Prior to the publication of Gilles 
Deleuze’s cinema books, theorists such as T. W. Adorno feared the advent of the 
Hollywood Studio film as akin to Nazi propaganda. Dismissed as elitist, Adorno’s 
concern was that mass produced and distributed artworks portrayed social norms as 
immutable reality. If the viewer’s imagination cannot enter and engage with 
messages depicted through the filmic medium, then viewers cannot critique the 
moral and social status quo as screened; instead, they simply receive it, and the 
depicted stereotypes are reinforced. Audiences may be able to engage critically with 
such narratives, yet the focus on the reception of the narrative screened is worth 
considering in further detail. In this paper, Adorno will be read alongside 
Benjaminesque theories of film, in order to focus on the critical attitude of the viewer, 
as well as the moral messages of the film. While there are many different stories 
being told in contemporary culture, the focus on the critical thinker, the interpreter of 
the narrative, is vital.  
 
If critical thinkers are important for society and films as mass art can engender a 
critical reception then Adorno’s concern for uncritical ingestion of mass art would be 
valid. Although Adorno may have overstated his concern, his desire for critical 
reflection of mass art appears to be well placed, and is a sentiment shared by 
Benjamin. As Miriam Hansen notes:  
 
Abandoning his defensive stance against the cinema as a mass media, 
Adorno can even conceive of a "liberated" film which would have to "extricate 
its a priori collectivity from the mechanisms of unconscious and irrational 
influence" and enlist it "in the service of emancipatory intentions." Benjamin 
would not have disagreed (1981, 192). 
 
 
Film, as a technological art form, can be viewed and understood by many people 
virtually on first contact (Carroll, 2004, 486-7) and can elicit powerful responses. The 
nature of these various responses is still under debate, but includes responding to 
the emotional quality of films, their images and realistic representations (Wartenberg, 
2007, 5) that can depict various aspects of society, character and politics. Following 
Carroll, I shall use the term ‘mass art’ to refer to mass produced and distributed 
artworks such as film. On Carroll’s definition (1998,196), film is art qua art, yet it may 
not be very good (both aesthetically and ethically). Following the influence of 
Deleuze, much of the current philosophy and film literature is optimistic with regards 
to the potential of films to explore philosophical ideas. The cinematic experience is 
powerful because it combines sensory input with story to convey social, political, and 
emotional truths. Felicity Colman illustrates this in her claim: 
 
The audio-visual nature of certain cinema…achieves ‘a victory’ over th[e] 
heirarchization of modes and concepts of art. This is also a victory in 
philosophical terms for art as a political form that contributes something to the 
world (2011, 253). 
 
This idea that film can provide a social commentary and thus be meaningful, as 
opposed to mindless, is an aspect of the contemporary Deleuzean approach to film 
that reflects the optimism that emerges from Benjamin who celebrates the potential 
of films to screen ideas. Yet the stronger claim that can be read from Benjamin’s 
writings that critical detachment is somehow built into mass media because 
audiences watching films are distracted (Benjamin, 1969, 240) should be re-
considered. Adorno and Horkheimer warn of the less desirable aspects of cinema 
such as the passivity of its viewers and its economic motivation. These concerns 
need to be considered alongside Benjamin’s celebration of cinema. Neither 
Benjamin or Adorno and Horkheimer are completely correct, yet both hold value and 
are relevant to reconsidering important ethical aspects of film spectatorship. 
 
Osborne and Charles remark that, “the ecstatic character of Benjamin's political 
thought at the outset of the 1930s, sees technology appear on a political knife-edge 
between its possibilities as “a fetish of doom” and “a key to happiness” (2011). Film, 
when fetishised, is focused on making money or promoting an ideology rather than 
telling stories as a narrative art form. Carroll notes, “Perhaps the greatest anxieties 
about mass art concern morality” (1998, 291) and Benjamin points out that, for 
example, fascism can pervert the natural tendencies of mass art (1969, 243-4). Yet 
there should be a reconsideration of the stronger claim that can be read from 
Benjamin; namely that mass art has “natural tendencies” that are emancipatory. We 
can see that film may be motivated by economic reasons as well as ideological ones 
when we consider the numerous sequels of, for example, Fast and Furious which 
are enthusiastically received by mass audiences.1 It is useful to re-examine and 
juxtapose Adorno and Horkheimer’s view with Benjamin’s. In doing so, we are 
reminded of the ability film has to manipulate and be used as an economic and 
political apparatus, as well as a vehicle for harmless entertainment and, possibly, 
insight and even wisdom. Even though Adorno does not envision the potential and 
possibility of film in the way that Benjamin speculated and Deleuze celebrated, his 
concerns should not be dismissed. Film, as an art of the masses, embedded within 
society and used by social, political, moral humans, has the potential to be 
constructive or destructive.  
 
Benjamin acknowledges the potential for mass art to manipulate, yet he contends 
that mass art is progressive in its ability to transform human perception, not by 
expressing or emblematizing it, but by encouraging its evolution (Carroll, 1998, 122). 
For Benjamin, film allows the viewer to stand outside of it, critically. This is due to the 
                                            
1
 Fast & Furious 5 is listed by Screen Australia as one of the Top 50 films in Australia ranked by reported gross 
earnings. Director Justin Lin is up to #6 (2013) with #7 due for release in 2014. 
camera work as mediator between actor and viewer that, “permits the audience to 
take the position of a critic, without experiencing any personal contact with the actor” 
(Benjamin, 1969, 228-9). As an aside, the influence of Bertolt Brecht and Sergei 
Eisenstein in this approach is critiqued by Adorno who is wary of Benjamin’s use of 
these theorists in supporting a strong claim about the emancipatory power of film 
(Osborne, 2008, 63). From Benjamin we learn that the power of film may be 
harnessed once we have recognised the mechanisms of the apparatus (Benjamin, 
1991–1999, 107-8). As noted, Benjamin’s theory does not discount film being used 
either to empower or to attempt to monopolise viewers with images depicted en 
masse. Osborne and Charles (2011) note that Benjamin's writings on film are justly 
renowned for their twin theses of the transformation of the concept of art by its 
‘technical reproducibility’ and the new possibilities for collective experience this 
contains, in the wake of the historical decline of the ‘aura’ of the work of art, a 
process that film is presented as definitively concluding. While this more traditional 
art aura regresses, there is also the chance, Benjamin suggests, of a newly liberated 
‘distracted’ viewer who is progressive, keeping up with the new, active filmic 
techniques (Markus, 2001, 17). Yet, Adorno’s concern that the new media will lead to 
a dystopia or even the collapse of civilization should give us pause to think more 
deeply about the impact of mass art on viewers. 
 
For Adorno, who is concerned with the aesthetic value of unique artworks, the loss of 
aura is not cause to celebrate; the technologically reproducible artwork is not as 
valuable because it does not challenge the viewer to actively engage with the picture 
of society it presents. In this way, mass artworks are unlike so-called ‘high’ or avant-
garde artworks, and thus lack ethical as well as aesthetic value. Adorno and 
Horkheimer state, “The double mistrust of traditional culture as ideology is combined 
with the mistrust of industrialized culture as a swindle” (161). Adorno has been 
criticized as being elitist and his writings on jazz certainly do nothing to defend him 
from this claim (McCann, 2008, 12-13). However, it must be noted that the sense of 
value to which he refers is not simply aesthetic, but also social and political. With the 
benefit of hindsight, if we acknowledge that Adorno was overly critical of the medium 
of film and over-stated his ethical and social concerns with regards to the passivity of 
viewers, some of his critique is still salvageable and relevant to the contemporary 
debate about film and philosophy. Furthermore, it is important to take the 
conversation in its context of Hitler taking control of Germany in the 1930s and the 
Nazi effort to eliminate avant-garde art that challenged the political picture of the 
Weimar Republic they wished to sustain. Having witnessed the effect of propaganda 
in Nazi Germany and moving to America to form the Frankfurt School, Adorno and 
Horkheimer bore witness to the rise of the Hollywood Studio Film system in Post-
WWII America. Writing in the 1930-50s, they worried about the ethical impact of the 
culture industry on society and the lack of diverse narratives being screened. While 
the current social and political climate is much changed, their focus on the moral 
impact of engaging with mass produced and distributed products of a media industry 
is still of relevance today. The alleged lack of value (aesthetic and ethical) and the 
promotion of negative values (e.g. hyper-nationalism) of mass-consumed artworks 
require examination, even if not all films are guilty of Adorno’s criticisms. Instead of 
dismissing Adorno as a naysayer whose critique of film restricts the possibilities for 
creative expression via a technologically reproducible medium, a re-reading of 
Adorno is timely with respect to the moral consideration and social importance of this 
popular form of art.  
 
The writings of both Benjamin and Adorno are relevant in our technological society 
with its blurry lines between art, media and technological sharing platforms and 
social networking sites. We can value the different stories being told in contemporary 
culture, but we must also be mindful of the context in which these stories are 
conveyed and received. If films are powerful tools for communication, then we may 
convey many diverse messages through the power of story. The viewer’s up-take of 
such messages may be constructive or destructive, as the creative force has the 
potential for both. An obvious example of this is the fine line that separates 
propaganda from entertainment whereby we cannot always tell the difference in 
product or affect. Directors have the ability to encourage a positive (life-affirming) or 
a negative (life-denying) response to people, events and the earth itself: ranging 
from Disney and Michael Bay’s proclamations of ‘save the world!’ to Lars Von Trier’s 
attitude of ‘let it all explode’. With this in mind, I propose we reconsider film 
spectatorship by re-reading Adorno alongside Benjamin.  
 
Where is the place for the thinking viewer in the cinema? 
 
This optimism of the power of film to think and encourage thinking is taken up by 
contemporary theorists like Thomas Wartenberg who see film as a vehicle for 
screening philosophical thought experiments and offering new perspectives on 
issues that (may) have relevance to everyday life. Wartenberg claims that, “film is 
able to give philosophical concepts and ideas a human garb that allows their 
consequences to be perceived more clearly” (2007, 5) and, “films can make 
arguments, provide counterexamples to philosophical claims, and put forward novel 
philosophical theories” (2007, 9). If films allow for philosophical thinking, then they 
are like some other so-called ‘high’ artworks in that they encourage social, political 
and economic critique of social norms. If contemporary films depict diverse 
narratives instead of constructing a homogenous picture of social reality, then 
audiences are encouraged to think critically by imaginatively engaging with multiple 
perspectives, thereby alleviating Adorno’s fear of passivity. Yet, Adorno’s (albeit 
overstated) concerns are still worthy of discussion. Many if not most popular films 
that are digested in large quantities promote stereotypes with dubious moral values. 
Wartenberg is correct to claim that some films are philosophical, yet he gives 
examples of Hollywood Blockbusters to support his claim though it is mostly these 
films that are subject to the Adornian criticism. Hollywood Blockbuster films that are 
screened ubiquitously and make the most revenue are the kinds of mass produced 
and distributed works to which Adorno objects. Theorists who conceive of cinema as 
a means of thinking must still reply to the objection that most films simply do not 
encourage active, intelligent, imaginative participation with the stereotypes therein 
depicted. While this does not demolish claims that films can somehow ‘do’ 
philosophy, the acknowledgement that film may encourage critical reception must not 
discount the caution offered by Adorno.  
 
Wartenberg acknowledges how realistic and convincing the depictions are through 
the filmic medium, yet he doesn’t acknowledge the criticism of this very same quality. 
For Wartenberg, the life-like quality of films allows the viewer to be absorbed in the 
narrative. Yet it is this same feature that results in many Blockbuster films resisting 
imaginative engagement by presenting their story in a manner so all-inclusive that 
there is less room to imagine it differently. Most Blockbuster films depict stories in 
approximately 90-120 minutes, tying up loose ends in order to leave a feeling of 
resolution with the viewer. The viewer is not given the time to reflect on the story 
while watching it, as they may do when reading a book, which adds to the sense that 
the story is immutable. A screened story is designed to be ingested as a whole, is 
usually less complex than a novel and invokes base emotional responses such as 
revenge, sadness, romance etcetera without encouraging any critique of the context 
that elicits these feelings (Levine, 2001, 63-71). Film is almost always designed to be 
accessible. While this in itself is not a bad thing, accessibility often means that 
detailed argument is lost and ‘watered down’ due to the compressed nature of film. 
Admittedly, films do not have to be simplified in this manner, but many, particularly 
Blockbusters, are and these are the most watched films. Even Wartenberg 
acknowledges that structural avant-garde films:  
 
are made for a small, intellectual audience, not for the huge audience that 
Hollywood films aim to reach. As a result, they are more hermetic, harder to 
watch and understand, and call for a very different type of attention than do 
standard fiction films (2007, 117).  
 
From Wartenberg’s comment it may be discerned that, in contrast to avant-garde 
films, Blockbusters are designed to be easier to watch and understand, precisely 
because they are targeted at large audiences. It is accepted that there are Auteurs 
who knowingly engaging with philosophical ideas and portray them through film, yet 
they cannot 'do philosophy' without the audience actively participating in the 
experience and reflecting on the ideas presented. The quote above also makes 
mention of the kind of attention called for, from the spectator, to appropriately receive 
the film. I would suggest that viewers watching films philosophically, and those 
watching philosophical films, are already critical thinkers which explains their 
attraction to philosophical films requiring of them this ‘very different type of attention’. 
A crucial aspect of film’s raison d’être is to be seen, engaged with and received. If 
only some films allow for critique of social, political and economic norms and these 
films are attended by critical viewers, then how is film more generally a tool for 
thinking? It must be acknowledged that Hollywood blockbusters attract a large 
proportion of cinema-going audiences and these Blockbuster films are unlikely to 
attract critical thinkers.  
 
Wartenberg acknowledges this criticism and replies as follows with reference to 
Charles Chaplin’s Modern Times (1936): 
 
Still, the objector might persist, even if you are right about that, viewers do not 
watch the Chaplin film for its philosophical insights, but for its humor. Although 
you might be able to squeeze some philosophy out of its portrayal of the 
assembly line, we are not interested in the film for that, but rather for Chaplin's 
amazing antics. Here, I can only agree that Chaplin's comic riffs are an 
important source of our interest in Modern Times. But I would go on to point 
out that the humor of the sequence I have been discussing is intimately bound 
up with the thought that the human being is functioning as a machine, 
mechanically…As I see it, you cannot separate the film's serious thinking 
about alienation from its comic portrayal in order to deny that the film involves 
a philosophically significant contribution (2006, 30).  
 
Wartenberg claims that in order to understand the film and appreciate its humour, 
you are already thinking about the philosophical concepts of human and machine. 
Yet, the viewer may not reflect on arguments about industrialization in order to laugh 
at the film and, as such, they may not be ‘doing philosophy’. In order to be ‘doing 
philosophy’ surely the viewer has to be aware that they are thinking about the 
philosophical concept under discussion. If there is no reflection on a concept, in this 
instance, on the concept of mechanization and the human as automaton, then this is 
not an instance of philosophical thinking. Wartenberg is suggesting that to 
understand the humour, you are also understanding the concept philosophically, i.e. 
of human as automaton. However, if philosophical thinking is broadened out as 
Wartenberg here describes, then family resemblance is lost and any kind of mental 
activity that involves thinking becomes ‘doing philosophy’. Philosophy, in this way, 
ceases to be recognized as reflective thinking that involves considering arguments, 
counter-arguments and responses. As we have already seen, Wartenberg 
acknowledges these elements are important to philosophy. While some films may be 
able to philosophize in this manner, if the spectator is not aware of the arguments 
being made, can it be claimed that the spectator is doing philosophy simply by 
laughing at the images depicted? Whether or not this claim is upheld, it returns us to 
Adorno’s suggestion that the focus on the viewer is of relevance to critical 
engagement with mass art. 
 
What we can learn from Adorno: 
 
Prior to the publication of Deleuze’s cinema books, theorists like Adorno and 
Horkheimer feared the advent of the Hollywood Studio film as akin to Nazi 
propaganda. Dismissed as elitist, their concern was that mass produced and 
distributed artworks portrayed social mores as immutable reality. If the viewer’s 
imagination cannot critically engage with film, i.e. through montage or similar ‘shock’ 
techniques, then viewers cannot critique the moral and social status quo screened; 
instead, they simply receive it, and it is reinforced. Concerned that technology within 
a capitalist framework allows for mass produced and distributed artworks to be 
formulaically churned out, creating a culture industry, Adorno claims in ‘Culture 
Industry Revisited’:  
 
although the culture industry undeniably speculates on the conscious and 
unconscious states of the millions towards which it is directed, the masses are 
not primary, but secondary, they are an object of calculation; an appendage to 
the machinery. The customer is not king, as the culture industry would have us 
believe, not its subject but its object (13).  
 
Adorno’s hostility towards the culture industry is evident but times have changed 
and, as Thomas Wartenberg notes in the preface to his Thinking On Screen: Film as 
Philosophy: 
 
I am struck by a sense of arrival…for the field of film and philosophy. When I 
began to argue that films could be relevant to philosophical concerns, that 
claim was met with a rather stony silence in the world of Anglo-American 
philosophy.  
 
Yet, amongst this relatively new-found enthusiasm for film by analytic philosophers, it 
must be acknowledged that much of mass produced and distributed art is primarily 
aimed at commercial success as opposed to encouraging critical spectatorship. 
Often appearing to promote equality and challenging the existing social, class and 
racial discriminations, when critically examined, the messages of most Hollywood 
productions is one of the status quo that encourages viewers to passively accept the 
depicted version of social values.  
 
Defining values as generalized, with cross-situational dispositions acting in certain 
ways, Barry Brummett claims that values can show through form in film, even without 
the medium being exclusively linguistic (2013, 62). Films convey values to the 
audience through the way they conclude a narrative, depicted images and scenes, 
and enhance mood through lighting, sound, and visual effects (Brummet, 2013, 66). 
Relying on the notions of homology as tied to ideology, Brummett explains that: 
 
This idea of homology can be a way to understand how texts may appeal to 
values without ever linguistically articulating them. Predispositions to respond 
to and to judge, socially held guides for choices, all the things that values 
“are”, may be activated at a formal level. This is not the same thing as being 
brought to conscious awareness, because we are so often not fully aware of 
how form is working in our texts and our experiences. Like ideology, form is 
most powerful when it is most invisible, and that is most of the time (64).   
 
Brummett suggests that we read films through their formal features in the same way 
we read and understand social contexts. Films are lifelike and viewers have a shared 
understanding of social expression which comprises non-verbal as well as linguistic 
conventions. As such, we communicate and gather meaning, including values, from 
film in much the same way as we do in everyday life. For example, the first scene in 
a romantic comedy where the protagonist meets or sees the character with whom 
they will eventually form a romantic relationship will be shot in a certain way with 
specific music and lighting and the body language of the characters will indicate to 
viewers that this is the relationship we are watching to see how it unfolds (which is, 
often, predictably). This ideal of a ‘soulmate’ may then play out in the film suggesting 
that the ideal relationship is one that overcomes odds and ends ‘happily ever after’. 
 
Adorno was concerned about the homogenizing effect of the culture industry which 
depicted specific social and moral messages. Adorno did not allow space for critical 
engagement with mass artworks. In creating products for consumer consumption, 
Adorno claims that the mass produced and distributed artworks are all different, yet 
all the same, creating a homogenized product that is willingly ingested by the 
masses. Adorno explains: 
 
Illusory universality is the universality of the art of the culture industry, it is the 
universality of the homogenous same, an art which no longer even promises 
happiness but only provides easy amusement as relief from labour (1997, 7).  
 
Adorno’s concern does not apply to every film, yet there are certainly formulaic and 
homogenous stories told and re-told through mass artworks. If we consider the 
Hollywood Blockbuster Romance films, and apply Brummett’s technique of reading 
the patterned rhetorical messages throughout a few of them, we reach this same 
conclusion. Whereas Brummett claims the message is not explicitly argued for, he 
details readings of films that give rise to certain values embedded in the form of the 
films (67). This is evident in Romantic comedies that have a predictable plot line of 
girl meets boy, girl is not interested in boy, there is an event that causes them to 
have to work together in some manner, and they eventually fall for each other, only 
being reunited and professing their love at the last minute after encountering a 
number of obstacles designed to separate them. The values of “true love conquers 
all” and the idea of taking a “leap of faith” as love is only truly love if you have to risk 
something in order to pursue it are common themes in such films. The interesting 
question is what, if any, affect do such stories have on viewers?  
 
Certainly, Adorno overstates his claim and his view is too extreme as evidenced 
when he writes that even those viewers attempting to engage with mass art actively 
or critically, are only ever enacting a pseudo-active voice and are doomed to 
ineffectual rebellion against such stories. Adorno writes, “whenever they attempt to 
break away from the passive status of compulsive consumers and ‘activate’ 
themselves, they succumb to pseudo-activity (1997, 52-53).” Adorno here is referring 
to acts of rebellion such as ‘writing letters of complaint’ that are ineffectual against 
the mass culture industry. These days, however, there is much power to be had in 
the voice of the dissatisfied consumer who makes use of social media in order to 
express their perspective. The viewer can be critical and express an active voice. 
However, despite his lack of recognition of the power of the individual spectator, 
Adorno’s belief that mass consumerism forms an economic urge to create easily 
digestible works for the lowest common denominator must not be disregarded. The 
‘rom-com’ is a case in point. The viewer may be critical of the film’s story, yet is likely 
to have the relevant emotions at the end when the couple finally overcome adversity 
and admit their love for each other. As the music swells, there is a close-up of two 
smiling faces, and even the cynical viewer is moved. They may not apply this belief 
in soulmates to their own life, but they may feel the burden of the stereotype each 
time they are asked why they ‘aren’t married yet’ or when are they ‘going to settle 
down?’ 
 
Adorno first claimed in The Culture Industry that the masses seek and love the rules 
by which they are bound through buying in to mass cultural commodities and their 
associated ideals. It is certainly the case that the culture industry has acquired and 
maintained immense social, political and economic power. Even when we knowingly 
engage with products of this culture industry such as Reality TV, gossip magazines, 
sartorialist street style blogs and relentless twitter feeds, are we not still buying in to 
that machine? Adorno is wrong to claim that the viewer is almost always completely 
passive and cannot counter the narrative and its associated values screened. 
However, as Brummett details, the subtle messages of values and ideology are 
screened and do reinforce existing social values. Brummett explains: 
 
Values are rarely, if ever, explicitly articulated in the films, and if they are, is it 
in the context of arguments about how to deal with instant babies rage virus 
[i.e. science fiction or fantasy films that may have a clear ethic explicitly 
screened] – hardly the sort of relevance one encounters in everyday life. Yet I 
think the homology obtained across the films, the audience’s experience of the 
strange urban context likely invokes a sense of values and their application 
(66). 
 
Brummett’s explanation of the homogenized messages and values that pervade 
films is tied to the understanding that films are created by social, moral and political 
people and companies. Likewise, there is an understanding of the seemingly obvious 
point that the reason viewers understand films is because they too understand the 
social context of which they are also a part. This more subtle reading of how film 
influences viewers is compatible with the ethical concern described by Adorno. 
Although Adorno’s original thesis is too strong, his worry is still recognizable in film 
spectatorship today.  
 
Adorno’s point to be remembered is that films are created in a political, social and 
economic context and they influence the society which sustains them. One aim of 
Hollywood films is to keep the attention of mass audiences in a bid to retain their 
economic contribution. One way this is achieved is by not challenging certain 
stereotypes that attract mainstream and widespread audiences. These stereotypes 
have imbedded values linked to ideological contexts. While there is room within the 
dominant capitalist ideology for diversity, capitalism seeks to remain dominant and 
therefore does not allow a great deal of diversity. As Adorno observes, the value of 
creative autonomy is the expression of diverse perspectives. This idea is summed up 
by Thomas Osborne who writes, “the idea of creative autonomy here is an ethical 
idea rather than a substantive notion: a regulative ideal rather than an 
accomplishable goal” (2008, 9). Adorno uses the word autonomy, Osborne claims, 
as a speculative notion as opposed to a concrete goal. This is to say that the word is 
not formally defined, yet advocates striving for autonomy and creative expression as 
opposed to uniformity. The more the culture industry allows for diverse narratives 
and values, the more creative it is. This in turn allows for critical spectatorship.   
 
Throughout his writings it is evident that Adorno’s thought evolves as reflected in his 
conversations and letters to Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer. In ‘The Culture 
Industry Revisited’, Adorno slightly modifies his initial claim that audiences are 
completely passive, asserting that audiences do mistrust authority which allows them 
to distinguish between art (or mass art) and reality. Several years later when 
interviewed on the radio, Adorno seemed surprised that the masses were able to, 
“critically assess the political and social implications of the event” (Hansen, 1981-2, 
60), in this case the wedding of Dutch Princess Beatrix to a German diplomat. He 
was forced to conclude that complete manipulation of the masses by those in power 
via the culture industry is not possible. Similarly, he acknowledged that the 
consciousness of the masses is (or could be) varied, multiple and dynamic. 
 
This theoretical progress Adorno makes reflects the changes in mass art at the time 
he is writing, from the monopoly of the Hollywood Studio system in the 30s and 40s 
to the increased diversification in the industry. From my perspective, this progress 
also increases the plausibility of Adorno’s ethical, political and economic concerns 
with regard to mass art. Although Adorno’s conclusions are overstated and draw 
from a specific cultural context, his ethical concerns should not be so quickly 
dismissed. While it may not be the case that monopolising capitalist and consumerist 
forces will eventually ensure that we homogenize until we are devoid of individuality 
and distinction, the threat of being encouraged to passively ingest ‘facts’ from a 
variety of technological sources without critical reflection is a worrying prospect. This 
prospect is grounds for acknowledging Adorno’s later essay ‘Transparencies on Film’ 
as encouraging a subtle re-think of cinema as produced and displayed in an 
ideological context.  
 
In this later article, Adorno claims:  
 
In its attempt to manipulate the masses the ideology of the culture industry 
itself becomes as internally antagonistic as the very society which it aims to 
control. The ideology of the culture industry contains the antidote to its own 
life. No other plea could be made for its defense (202).  
 
Films allow for diverse voices to be heard and screened, Adorno now acknowledges 
in ‘Transparencies on Film’. In this way the culture industry gives expression to 
repressed or minority values which could possibly rise up against the dominant 
ideology if not given an outlet. Yet, even if various voices are depicted, it is the 
dominant values that are ultimately reinforced. For example, “while intention is 
always directed against the playboy, the dolce vita and wild parties, the opportunity 
to behold them seems to be relished more than the hasty verdict (201-2).” In 
depicting these images, Adorno claims, the culture industry reinforces them. Adorno 
notes the complexity of the relationship between film and society. If technology and 
cinema go hand in hand, so too do accompanying social values. Adorno claims, 
“There could be no aesthetics of the cinema, not even a purely technological one, 
which would not include the sociology of the cinema (202).” In this way cinema 
cannot be purely aesthetic, it must also link to society and with social concerns.   
 
Continuing the Conversation with Walter Benjamin: 
 
When critiquing social, political and economic factors that influence the production 
and up-take of mass artworks, it is useful to read Adorno alongside Benjamin. 
Benjamin offers an optimistic account of the (politically, socially and personally) 
emancipatory potential of art as it develops technologically, even though he also 
recognises that commodities may be fetishised when used for their economic value 
and political and social power. Osborne details Benjamin’s attitude to mass art: 
 
Because modern experience just is technological it is right that art itself 
should be expressive of this. Art can serve as a means of mastering the 
elemental forces of a technological second nature. Photography and film 
accustom humanity to the new apperceptions conditioned by technology. 
Technological art – like film and photography – becomes the site of 
exploration of future relations between technology and the human (60). 
 
Certainly this has been proven as technology continues to advance and our use of it 
builds upon existing modes of self-expression. Benjamin and Adorno agreed that, in 
comparison to Art proper, the technological reproduction of mass art strips the 
artwork of its ‘aura’ or unique artistic quality. Adorno argues that loss of the aura of a 
work of art results in the simultaneous erosion of the artwork’s aesthetic value. Yet 
this is not the case for Benjamin. As Osborne articulates, for Benjamin, “contrary to 
Adorno, the end of the aura is not necessarily negative in its consequences” (61). 
However, Benjamin is not offering a directly oppositional thesis to Adorno. Benjamin 
acknowledges that there are many social effects in response to mass art, one being 
that, “the film responds to the shriveling of the aura with an artificial build-up of the 
“personality” outside the studio” (1969, 224). Adorno and Benjamin both see the 
technologically reproducible artwork as historical and contextual. In this way, mass 
art will continue to evolve.  
 
By reading Adorno alongside Benjamin, and by acknowledging the power of films to 
be potentially constructive (allowing for autonomy) or destructive (fetishizing the 
product for ideological or economic means), we get a more holistic vision of cinema 
as a socially situated activity. There is a need to focus on the critical attitude of the 
viewer, as well as the moral messages of the medium. This is particularly apparent 
when we consider what is watched by the majority of consumers. Adorno and 
Benjamin both offer a historical account of art whereby their aesthetics require 
audience reception and are linked to experience. Film communicates ideas and 
values that are received by viewers. While there are many different stories being told 
in contemporary culture, the focus on the critical thinker, the interpreter of the 
narrative, is vital in order to form a thinking society. 
 
Adorno’s method sometimes appears paradoxical and his principle of negative 
dialectics suggests we know freedom through its negation, and, likewise, autonomy 
when we are restricted. It is through the paradox of knowing what is not an example 
of freedom or autonomy that allows us to aim at what is and, Osborne points out, 
these terms are not defined in a positive or epistemic manner. Rather, the terms 
operate as paradoxes in order for us to work towards liberty and autonomy. Osborne 
writes, “One cannot simply posit freedom as if it could be unproblematically known: 
one is better occupied on a more negative task, in diagnosing the forces of 
unfreedom” (39). 
 
While Adorno worries about Hollywood Studio films, Benjamin focuses more of the 
avant-garde, the films of Eisenstein. Benjamin’s optimism may be partly a result of 
the artworks with which he engages. Osborne claims, 
 
Benjamin is diagnosing the progressive or at least redemptive potentiality of 
modern forms of mass art. Adorno’s whole question seems to be quite 
different from this: to measure the modern culture industry in ultimately 
ethical terms, that is, in terms of its relation to the forces of critical self-
reflection. Where Adorno sees regression, Benjamin sees possibility; but this 
is a difference that is the product of their differing critical styles more than 
anything else (62). 
 
Osborne’s comparison reveals that Benjamin and Adorno are not using the same 
methodology, nor are they offering oppositional arguments. Thus, they both offer 
useful ideas to contemporary theorists of film and philosophy. Indeed, Adorno’s 
critique of Benjamin is useful in offering a subtle re-reading of both. Adorno laments 
Benjamin’s lack of a dialectical perspective (62). Adorno writes to Benjamin on 18 
March 1936; 
 
In your earlier writings… you distinguished the idea of the work of art as a 
structure from the symbol of theology on the one hand, and from the taboo of 
magic on the other. I now find it somewhat disturbing —and here I can see a 
sublimated remnant of certain Brechtian themes—that you have now rather 
casually transferred the concept of the magical aura to the ‘autonomous work 
of work’ and flatly assigned a counter-revolutionary function to the latter 
(128). 
 
The question of whether the mass artwork is valuable as a tool to prompt critical 
thinking becomes tied to the idea that it does, or does not, have an aura. As seen in 
Adorno’s quote above, the definition of what an aura is changes and is unclear. 
Benjamin defines ‘aura’ as, “A strange weave of space and time: the unique 
appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be” (Benjamin, 
1991-9, 518-9). Deleuze echoes this definition in the concepts of time and space on 
which he focuses his Cinema books written in the 1980s. Fredric Jameson calls 
attention to the dialectic occurring between Benjamin and Adorno, explaining, 
 
Riposting against Benjamin’s attack on aesthetic ‘aura’ as a vestige of 
bourgeois culture and his celebration of the progressive function of 
technological reproducibility in art as the pathway to a new appropriation of 
it by the masses - realized above all in the cinema, Adorno replied with a 
defence of avant-garde art and a counter-attack against over-confidence in 
commercial-popular art (Bloch et al, 1977, 106). 
 
For Adorno, the beauty of the work of art qua artwork is that it does not tie up its 
ideas neatly and instead challenges the receiver to view reality in its representation, 
replete with its tensions and discordance. If art allows the viewer to see that there 
are multiple perspectives, it encourages critical spectatorship. In this way, “art is 
negative knowledge of the actual world” (1967, 32). Adorno here refers to the 
method of negative dialectics whereby one recognizes the paradoxes in society and 
can thus be a critical or active thinker. If mass art can allow for the same 
understanding, it fails to be limited to a homogenous status quo.  
 
Jameson suggests that contemporary philosophers of film have much to gain from 
revisiting the conversation that occurred between Adorno and Benjamin. He 
concludes: 
 
The force of many of these arguments remains pertinent today. It is clear 
that Benjamin, following Brecht, tended to hypostasize techniques in 
abstraction from relations of production, and to idealize diversions in 
ignorance of the social determinants of their production. His theory of the 
positive significance of distraction were based on a specious generalization 
from architecture, whose forms are always directly used as practical objects 
and hence necessarily command a distinct type of attention from those of 
drama, cinema, poetry or painting. …Where Benjamin manifestly 
overestimated the progressive destiny of the commercial-popular of his 
time, Adorno no less clearly over-estimated that of the avant-garde art of 
the period (Bloch et al, 1977, 107-8). 
 
The letters between Benjamin and Adorno between 1935-9 reveal much of the 
strengths and weaknesses of both writers’ theories. The publication of these letters 
in English in 1999 invoked resurgence in interest in both scholars, particularly 
Adorno, who has been somewhat neglected by philosophy of film scholars’ attraction 
to the more optimistic writings of Benjamin. Adorno insightfully recognizes the 
‘psychogistic subjectivism and ahistorical romanticism’ in Benjamin’s work and notes 
the Spinozean influence upon Benjamin that could develop in one of two extreme 
directions: it can be taken as a primal nostalgia for unity with nature: an unbridled 
Romanticism; or as a utopian vision of classlessness that lacks class (or ‘taste’) 
entirely (Bloch et al, 1977, 103). The problem being that both perspectives are 
ungrounded, floating in a de-contextualised space, not linked to social reality, time 
and place. In this way, both perspectives become overly subjective and emotive. This 
critical insight Adorno has into Benjamin’s work is one reason we should re-consider 
his critique of, not only Benjamin’s optimism but of the contemporary approach 
towards philosophy and film as a technologically mass-produced and consumed 
medium (Bloch et al, 1977, 104). This is not to argue that we should adopt Adorno’s 
negative critique whole-sale either, but, as we wish to promote critical engagement in 
viewers of films, so too may philosophers critically engage with both Adorno and 
Benjamin.   
 
Conclusion:  
 
As J. M. Bernstein has written, “Adorno’s is not so much an ‘objective’ analysis as a 
perspectival one” (cited in Osborne, 2008, 63). The perspectives offered by Adorno 
and Benjamin may give us cause to re-consider film and philosophy, particularly with 
reference to film spectatorship. Mass art is democratic in its accessibility, and it is 
because of this social nature of film that we should celebrate what may be expressed 
through film, and also be mindful of potential impact upon viewers.  
 
Films may promote a critical response to society, yet it may be that such films are 
already preaching to the converted. Teaching audiences to think critically is vital, 
particularly when other technological mediums are considered such as the broadcast 
news, the internet, blogs and other social-networking sites. Furthermore, there are 
practical implications and ethical concerns that mass untutored audiences, including 
children, are watching films that may contain unethical messages. In light of this, the 
focus on the critical viewer, with the educative notion of teaching viewers to be 
critical, is worth further consideration.   
 
The concept of the value of the artwork, how it should be valued (aesthetically and 
ethically), its affect (its impact upon viewers, its critical reception as well as its 
production, including the intention of the author(s)) are all important issues. Where 
there is the potential for positive or life-affirming messages or affect being conveyed, 
there is equally the potential for the transmission of life-denying or nihilistic 
messages. If mass art encourages viewers to critique society, Adorno and Benjamin 
would claim this is a good thing. However, where passive viewing is promoted, we 
must ask what values are being uncritically ingested and whether or not this has an 
effect on viewers and on society. Ultimately I will conclude that we do not need 
censorship, rather, we need critical reception and a continued conversation. This is 
of the utmost importance in a world where so much is uncritically ingested and mass 
messages are transmitted and seductively screened ubiquitously. To paraphrase 
Adorno, the art will only change when its audiences do. There is still a need for 
philosophy proper and philosophical thinking skills, and they should continue to be 
applied to film. 
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